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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
the result reached is consonant with the prevailing principle that a criminal statute
should be strictly construed in favor of the defendant.44
Convicfion For Speeding Based Upon Speedometer Reading
In a prosecution for speeding, when the evidence includes the arresting
officer's statement of his speedometer reading while following the defendant's car,
must the People prove the accuracy of the instrument? Although a number of
County Courts in New York have held that when there was no competent evidence
of the accuracy of the speedometer, a conviction based upon a speedometer reading
will be reversed, 45 there is an "almost tomb-like silence"40 on this question in the
state appellate courts.
The silence is rendered somewhat less than deafening by the opinion in
People v. Heyser,47 wherein the Nassau County Court's affirmance of defendant's
conviction in a Court of Special Sessions is upheld. The Court declares: "In our
opinion, evidence of the reading of an untested speedometer without more would
be insufficient to sustain a conviction for speeding."48 As a practical matter, this
is indeed of premonitory value, even though it is dictum only. The case actually
decided that evidence of the reading of an untested speedometer and an estimate
of approximately the same speed made by the pursuing officer "independent of the
speedometer," together are sufficient to sustain the conviction when there is also
in the record supporting evidence as to the expertise of the officer in judging
speed,49 and as to the adequacy of the officer's opportunity for observation, ° and
when the speed as found by the speedometer reading and the officer's "inde-
pendent" estimate exceeds the speed-limit by a substantial margin.51
In People v. Marsellus,52 decided about two months later, the Court follows
People v. Hiyser, stating that therein, ". . . we held at least by implication that
evidence as to what even an untested speedometer showed was admissible." A
fortiori, according to People v. Marsellus, where evidence presented on trial before
a Court of Special Sessions included the elements noted above, it was not error to
44. People v. Ahearn, 196 N.Y. 221, 89 N.E. 930 (1909).
45. People v. Boehme, 1 Misc.2d 629, 152 N.Y.S.2d 759 (County Ct. 1955);
People v. Rothstein, 1 Misc.2d 516, 152 N.Y.S.2d 757 (County Ct. 1955); People v.
Rice, 206 Misc. 999, 136 N.Y.S.2d 134 (County Ct. 1954); People v. Matthews,
4 Misc.2d 278, 155 N.Y.S.2d 873 (County Ct. 1956); People v. Greenhouse, 4 Misc.2d
692, 136 N.Y.S.2d 675 (County Ct. 1955).
46. Annot., 21 A.L.R.2d 1200 (1952).
47. 2 N.Y.2d 390, 161 N.Y.S.2d 36 (1957).
48. People v. Heyser, supra note 47 at 393, 161 N.Y.S.2d at 38.
49. People v. Matthews, supra note 45; People v. Rothstein, supra note 43
(cases distinguished by Court on grounds of no evidence in record of officer's
expertise).
50. People v. Greenhouse, supra note 45 (distinguished by Court in that
officer did not have adequate opportunity for observation).
51. See People v. Boehme, supra note 45.
52. 2 N.Y.2d 653, 163 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1957).
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receive the State Police officer's testimony that six weeks before the arrest he
observed the satisfactory performance of his speedometer as compared with a
master speedometer in a test made by an employee of a service station where
State Police cars were customarily so checked, and the County Court's conclusion
that such receipt was error53 must be rejected. Consequently it was also reversible
error for the County Court to find that the trial court's finding of guilt was against
the weight of evidence, since the County Court reached this conclusion with the
evidence of the speedometer testing erroneously excluded from its consideration.
The law in New York as it now stands would seem to be as follows: (1)
Evidence of the reading of an untested speedometer is admissible, but by itself
will probably be found insufficient to sustain a conviction for speeding. (2) Such
evidence coupled with a coinciding independent estimate of the defendant's speed
made by an officer qualified to judge speed may be sufficient to sustain a convic-
tion. (3) Evidence as to the testing of a speedometer even by an agency outside
the police department and without the testimony of the person who conducted
the test is admissible as long as the witness observed the test.
Receipt Of Bribes By Labor Representafive
Section 380 (2) of the New York Penal Law54 relating to the acceptance
of bribes by a labor representative was recently considered by the Court of Appeals
in People v. Cilento.15 In this case a labor representative was indicted for allegedly
accepting a bribe while acting in the capacity of trustee of the union welfare fund.
The Court reinstated the indictment after it was dismissed by the lower courts.56
As pointed out by the Appellate Division57 there generally is a valid distinc-
tion between the positions of trustee and labor representative, so that no question
arises as to whether section 380 (2) of the Penal Law applies. The problem arises
when the two positions are combined in the same person. In construing the section,
the Court of Appeals held that the term "labor representative" was not to be
considered generically but was to be interpreted in a broader sense to include any
duty imposed on a labor representative. The Court reasoned that where the con-
stitution of a union provides that a certain labor representative solely by virtue
53. People v. Marsellus, 4 Misc.2d 211, 157 N.Y.S.2d 148 (County Ct. 1956).
54. N.Y. PENAL LAW §380(2)'provides:
Any duly appointed representative of a labor organization
who solicits or accepts . . . any thing of value . . . that he
shall be influenced In respect to any of his duties . . . is
guilty of a misdemeanor.
55. 2 N.Y.2d 55, 156 N.Y.S.2d 673 (1956).
56. 207 Misc. 914, 143 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Gen. Sess. 1955); 1 A.D.2d 206, 149
N.Y.S.2d 14 (1st Dep't 1956).
57. 1 A.D.2d 206, 149 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1st Dep't 1956).
